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WHY TEACH ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS? 
BECAUSE WE ALREADY DO
Raymond Benton, Jr. and
Christine S. Benton
Abstract
In this paper we argue for the importance of the formal teaching of environmen-
tal ethics. This is, we argue, both because environmental ethics is needed to respond
to the environmental issues generated by the neoliberal movement in politics and
economics, and because a form of environmental ethics is implicit, but unexam-
ined, in that which is currently taught. We maintain that students need to become
aware of the latent ethical dimension in what they are taught. To help them, we
think that they need to understand how models and metaphors structure and impact
their worldviews. We describe how a simple in-class exercise encourages students
to experience the way metaphors organize feelings, courses of action, and cognitive
understandings. This is then intellectualized by way of Cliﬀord Geertz’s concept of
culture and his model for the analysis of sacred symbols. From there we present a
brief interpretation of modern economics as the embodiment of the dominant mod-
ern ethos. This leads into a consideration of ecology as a science, and to the envi-
ronmental ethic embodied in Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic.” We close with a personal
experience that highlights how environmental teaching can make students aware of
the presence of an implicit, but unexamined, environmental ethic. 
Keywords: environmental ethics, environmental education, culture, neoliberal economics
Introduction
The question “why teach environmental ethics?” seems central to a
collection of papers on the teaching of environmental ethics. We
consider there to be two related reasons why environmental ethics
should be taught. First, the last quarter century has witnessed the
spread of neoliberal ideas and the concomitant increased reliance on
market forces and the decreased reliance on non-market institutions,
especially government. We suggest that Aldo Leopold, writing in the
1940s, well before environmental issues had entered the public con-
sciousness, before the formation of the EPA, and before the passage
of landmark environmental laws, foresaw the coming of this neolib-
eral turn. In his essay, “The Land Ethic,” he wrote (1949: 213):
There is a clear tendency in American conservation to relegate to gov-
ernment all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform.
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Government ownership, operation, subsidy, or regulation is now widely
prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed manage-
ment, park and wilderness conservation, ﬁsheries management, and
migratory bird management, with more to come. Most of this growth
in governmental conservation is proper and logical, some of it is
inevitable. That I imply no disapproval of it is implicitly in the fact
that I have spent most of my life working for it. Nevertheless the ques-
tion arises: what is the ultimate magnitude of the enterprise? Will the
tax base carry its eventual ramiﬁcations? At what point will govern-
mental conservation, like the mastodon, become handicapped by its
own dimensions?
Leopold identiﬁed, in this passage, two issues that drive the neolib-
eral project—taxes and the ultimate size of government. He also
gave voice to the neoliberal solution—increased reliance on the indi-
vidual. “The answer,” Leopold continued in the passage just quoted,
“if there is any, seems to be in a land ethic, or some other force
which assigns more obligation to the private landowner.” According
to this argument we should teach environmental ethics because it is
likely to be the only answer to the environmental problems generated
in the context of the neoliberal movement in politics and economics. 
The other, related answer to the “Why” question is that we should
teach environmental ethics because we already do. This will be explained
in some detail as we explore an answer to a second question, “How
should we teach environmental ethics?” In addressing this second
question, we focus primarily on teaching environmental ethics to a
particular kind of student: those taking an MBA. Teaching MBA
students requires, we feel, a diﬀerent approach than would be required
if teaching, say, philosophy majors. MBA students expect to learn
something one day and apply it the next. Most are not accustomed
to ideological and intellectual introspection, and most do not see the
point in it. 
When we write about teaching environmental “ethics” to MBA
students, we have in mind a broader, less precise meaning to the
term than we suspect is most often conjured. As Des Jardins points
out (2001: 17-18), the word ethics is derived from the Greek word
ethos, meaning “custom.” In this sense, he writes, “ethics refers to
the general beliefs, attitudes, or standards that guide customary behav-
ior.”1 This is what we mean by ethics. Our meaning is more akin
to what is meant by its use in the terms “the Puritan ethic” or “the
work ethic.” Our concern is not with explicating formal rules to be
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applied in decision-making contexts, but with explicating the beliefs,
attitudes, values and standards that currently guide customary behav-
ior. Our preferred term for what we are talking about is, in fact,
ethos rather than ethics, and our jumping oﬀ point is not philosophy
but anthropology, in particular the anthropology of Cliﬀord Geertz.2
We do not view the teaching of ethics as an exercise in provid-
ing students with a new rulebook to follow. Instead, we view ethi-
cal responsibility as something that will come when students are given
the critical thinking skills to self-reﬂect on their contemporary situ-
ation. Consequently, determining what or which environmental ethics
should be taught falls outside the scope of this paper. Our main goal
is to outline the initial steps that must be taken prior to tackling the
“which environmental ethics” question. Suﬃce it to say, we would
support an environmental ethics that respects diﬀerent approaches
to decision-making and diﬀerent voices aﬀected by those decisions.
The environmental ethics that we would support would remain always
contextually based, because to decide a course of action requires that
the problem ﬁrst be understood as situated and described as such. 
Consequently, when we think about teaching environmental ethics
we are thinking along the lines expressed, again, by Des Jardins who
deﬁned ethics as “a self-conscious stepping back from our lives to
reﬂect on what we should do, how we should act, and what kind
of people we should be” (2001: 6). To us this is what all education
should be, and certainly should form the basis of a course in envi-
ronmental ethics. 
From our perspective, students need ﬁrst to become aware of the
latent ethical dimension in everything. But before that they need to
understand how models and metaphors shape understanding, and
then to become fully aware of which models and metaphors shape
their own understanding. We begin with an in-class exercise that
forces students to experience the way metaphors organize feelings,
courses of action, and cognitive understanding. We then intellectu-
alize this by way of Cliﬀord Geertz’s concept of culture and his
model for the analysis of sacred symbols. We make reference to the
dominant modern worldview before we brieﬂy suggest an interpre-
tation of modern economics as the embodiment of the dominant
modern ethos. Then we venture into the realm of ecology as a sci-
ence and take the road presented by Aldo Leopold’s “The Land
Ethic,” tying it into the lineage of modern economics. 
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1. Thinking, Conceptualizing, and Analyzing
Des Jardins writes: “a primary role of descriptive ethics is to make
explicit the models and metaphors that shape our understanding of
the world” (Des Jardins 2001: 157). But most students (and many
professors) do not really grasp how models and metaphors shape
their interpretations, understandings, feelings, and courses of action.
Demonstrating this is the ﬁrst step in our approach to teaching envi-
ronmental ethics. The following is a brief in-class exercise that makes
the point. 
We ask students to imagine that they have been on a trip, dur-
ing which they bought something. During their return travels home,
they strike up a conversation with somebody. This conversation turns
to that which they have bought and, eventually, to the price paid.
Upon learning the price paid, the other person indicates that they
got a steal, a bargain. At this point, we stop and ask the students
to describe how they feel about what they have just been told. Then
we ask them what they might do given the information that it was
a bargain, a really cheap price for what they bought. Finally, we
ask them what they know about the situation at hand (including the
original purchasing situation). 
To the “how do you feel” question, in varying forms most stu-
dents respond that they would be happy, elated, or proud. Some
respond that they would be suspicious of the person giving them this
information—how would they know whether it was a good deal or
not? Both responses, pride and suspicion, are recognizable responses
to everybody in the class. In the scores of times that this exercise
has been executed in class, only once did a student indicate they
would feel guilty. As a response, it was not recognized as realistic
by the rest of the class; they could not understand how anybody
would feel guilty in such a situation.
To the “what would you do” question, a variety of similar responses
are oﬀered: some would tell others, either out of pride of their ability
to shop or so the others can get the item as well; some might try
to sell it and realize a proﬁt; some indicate they would return and
buy more; others say they will just feel good about it. All are rec-
ognizable responses in that they make sense to others in the class. 
The question regarding “what they know” about the situation gen-
erally brings puzzlement. They often do not understand what is
asked. If a response is given, it is often simply, “Just because.” They
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develop the ability to understand the question, and how to respond
to it, in the second part of this exercise. 
In order to change the circumstances of the thought experiment,
we stop at this point and suggest they transport themselves to another
place or to another time. This “other place” is seriously religious
and relies on an organic analogy to think about, conceptualize, and
analyze social and economic relations. Without identifying sources,
we read a few passages from historical sources so they can grasp for
themselves how these other people “see the world.” For example,
we read a passage from Wycliﬀ:
The Church is divided in these three parts, preachers, and defenders,
and . . . laborers. . . . As she is our mother, so she is a body, and health
of this body stands in this, that one part of her answers to another,
after the same measure that Jesus Christ has ordained it. . . . Kindly
man’s hand helps his head, and his eye helps his foot, and his foot
his body . . . and thus should it be in parts of the Church. . . . as diverse
parts of man served unkindly to man if one took the service of another
and left his own proper work, so diverse parts of the Church have
proper works to serve God; and if one part leaves his work that God
has limited him and take work of another part, sinful wonder is in
the Church. . . . Surely the Church shall never be whole before pro-
portions of her parts be brought again by this heavenly leech and by
medicine of men (as quoted by Tawney 1926: 29).
During the discussion that follows, we emphasize that not only does
each member occupy a deﬁned role, members must receive the means
suited to their stations in life so that they can carry out their func-
tions. No more than this must be claimed, for, quoting Tawney this
time (1926: 27), “if one takes into his hand the living of two, his
neighbor will go short.” If people run short, are deprived of neces-
sary means, they will not be able to perform their functions. 
A passage from John of Salisburg further makes the point: 
The health of the whole commonwealth will be assured and vigorous,
if the higher members consider the lower and the lower answer in like
manner the higher, so that each is in turn a member of every other
( John of Salisburg, quoted by Tawney 1926: 29).
Finally, we quote a passage from an unpublished essay of John Locke:
When any man snatches for himself as much as he can, he takes away
from another man’s heap the amount he adds to his own, and it is
impossible for anyone to grow rich except at the expense of someone
else (quoted in Spiegel 1971: 165).
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This is generally enough. Now, after brief discussion, we revisit the
initial scenario. We ask them how they would now feel, what they
might now do, and what they might now reasonably know about the
situation if they lived in this other time and conceptualized the world
through this other conceptual scheme. This time most indicate they
would now feel guilty. Some students insist that they would still feel
good about their “steal.”3 We point out that they are thinking with
our current conceptual model, not with the organic analogy intro-
duced. Most students eventually see the diﬀerence. Admittedly, some
never do. What would they now do? Generally they would return to
the place of purchase and give the vendor his rightful due. What if
it is too far and is not practical to return? With some discussion stu-
dents usually come up with alternative courses of action: giving the
excess to charity; going to church to pray for forgiveness. 
To the question about what they might now reasonably know, they
explain how, by not having given the vendor his or her “due,” the
vendor will go short, not be able to perform his or her social duties,
and the community, as a whole, will suﬀer as a consequence. This
is because they would be depriving somebody of the necessary means
to perform their function in society. When asked to go back and
explain why they originally felt good they are still, generally, with-
out a response other than, “Just because it seems like a natural thing
to do.” But they grasp and understand that something is uncon-
sciously guiding their reactions (how they feel and what they might
do) even if they are unable to explain it. And they grasp the impor-
tance of understanding what this something is. 
2. Intellectualizing the Experience: the Concept of Culture 
At this point we can intellectualize the experience by introducing the
anthropology of Cliﬀord Geertz. Geertz’s concept of culture, which
he came to by way of the sociology of Talcott Parsons and the
philosophies of Susan Langer and Gilbert Ryle, is deﬁned as those
“historically transmitted patterns of meanings embodied in symbols,
systems of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms,” by
and through which people “communicate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (1973: 89). It is by
and through symbolic models, the imaginative universe within which
social action takes place, that humans give form, order, point, and
direction to their lives. 
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Behind the traditional concept of culture4 is an image, referred to
by Geertz as the Enlightenment image, of unembellished human
beings lying somewhere below, or behind, the trappings of local cus-
tom and tradition. This image holds culture to be an addition to an
otherwise biologically, neurologically, and anatomically completed
animal. Conversely, archaeological evidence strongly suggests that
culture, rather than being added on to an otherwise complete ani-
mal, was integral to its ultimate formation. Literally, people had a
hand (or a mind) in making themselves. Consequently, the mind and
the body evolved, at least during the ﬁnal stages, within the framework
of human culture and human symbolization. For this reason, human
culture, in the Geertzian sense of systems of symbols and meanings,
is not superﬂuous to human beings: it is deﬁning, it is essential. 
The argument can be put in terms of models. The term model
has, however, a dual aspect to it: there are models for as well as mod-
els of. Models for exist in nature, as in the genetic code, which is a
model—a blueprint—for reconstructing another of the same species.
But models of are apparently uniquely human. Beavers build their
houses, and birds ﬂy south, according to genetic information con-
tained intrinsically; humans build houses, and ﬂy wherever it is they
ﬂy—in machines—according to symbolic and extrinsic sources of
information, according to models of houses for house building, of
aerodynamics for the construction and operation of airplanes.
To fully grasp Geertz’s approach, the student must also grasp that
human thought is largely a metaphorical process. Human thought
consists of the construction and manipulation of symbol systems
employed as models of other non-symbolic systems in such a way that
the structure of these other systems, and how they may be expected
to behave, is “understood.” 
When we think, conceptualize, formulate, comprehend, understand,
or whatever, we match the states and processes of symbolic models
against the states and processes of the wider world. “Imaginal think-
ing is neither more nor less than constructing an image . . . of the
‘relevant features’ of the environment and then manipulating it under
various hypothetical conditions and constraints” (Galanter and Gersten-
habor 1956, quoted in Geertz 1973: 213). 
Conscious perception is, then, a “seeing as” or an “interpreting
as” phenomenon. People just don’t see something, they are not just
conscious of something, they see it and are conscious of it as being some-
thing. When they come upon an unfamiliar something they are sel-
dom content to let it remain unfamiliar but immediately ask what
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that certain something is. “What is missing and what is being asked
for are an applicable symbolic model under which to subsume the
‘unfamiliar something’ and so render it familiar” (1973: 215). 
Anthropologists make models, too, and Geertz developed a model
for the analysis of sacred symbols, a model of religion as a cultural
system. It is with and through this model that we feel we can
eﬀectively approach the teaching of environmental ethics. We want
to stress, again, that our concern is with the precursor to an explicit
treatment of environmental ethics, rather than proposing an envi-
ronmental ethics curriculum.
Sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s worldview and their
ethos. Sacred symbols bring a metaphysical acceptance of the way
things are, that is, the way they are thought to be (a worldview),
together with a moral, aesthetic, or evaluative element (an ethos).
The ﬁrst, the worldview, is a sense of the really real, the concepts
of nature, of self, of society, that provide the most comprehensive
ideas of the general order of existence within which a people ﬁnd
themselves. The second, the ethos, is an underlying attitude toward
life, a comprehensive moral and aesthetic attitude, a recommended
style of life. The worldview is an accepted model of reality; the ethos,
a model for living in that reality. The juxtaposition of the two gives
to the recommended style of life what it needs most if it is to be
coercive: the appearance of objectivity, an air of naturalness and
simple factuality. Proper conduct is supported “by picturing a world
in which such conduct is only common sense” (Geertz 1973: 129).
Sacred symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular
style of life and a speciﬁc (if, most often, implicit) metaphysic and,
in so doing, sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other
(Geertz 1973: 90). 
All sacred symbol systems assert that it is good for people to live
realistically; they diﬀer in the vision of reality that they construct.
Those individuals that fail to go along with the moral-aesthetic norms
formulated by the symbols, who follow an incongruent style of life
(particularly in those societies where such formulations go uncriti-
cized), are regarded not so much evil as stupid, insensitive, unlearned,
or mad. For those who are committed to them—and, as anthro-
pologist Edward T. Hall noted, we become very committed to them—
“men have fought and died in the name of diﬀerent models of
nature” (1977: 14)—sacred symbols mediate genuine knowledge,
knowledge of the essential conditions in terms of which life must, of
necessity, be lived. 
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3. The Dominant Modern Worldview and the Ethos that it Undergirds
For many students, understanding that human thought is essentially
metaphorical is illuminating; something they have never considered.
Geertz’s model of sacred symbols, of religion as a cultural system,
permits a direct unpacking, a thick-description, of the worldview con-
tained in traditional business courses and a reinterpretation of eco-
nomic theory as an embodiment of the ethos that the worldview
supports. To grasp the idea that there is a worldview lurking behind,
or beneath, the ethos, and that this worldview is often implicitly held
and unthinkingly accepted, is important in preparing the ground for
whatever environmental ethics curriculum is to be taught. 
This idea also lies behind our view that whenever we teach any-
thing, we already teach an environmental ethic, a set of beliefs, atti-
tudes, values and standards regarding the environment. It is diﬃcult
to recognize this ethic/ethos for what it is because it is uninten-
tionally taught and not formally part of the curriculum (sometimes
because instructors are not, themselves, aware of it). Consequently
the unconscious teaching of this traditional environmental ethic/ethos
is successful and has profound eﬀects. For this reason, students should
become consciously aware of their own ethos and of the worldview
that underlies it. Geertz’s model for the analysis of sacred symbols
paves the way.
4. The Dominant Modern Ethos: the Rules of the Game
Most MBA students are taught that economics is a science. But eco-
nomics can be recast as a cultural system and as a symbolic repre-
sentation of the dominant modern ethos where humans and the rest
of nature are seen as distinct, and the earth is seen as a resource
and a sink for human wastes (Benton 1982, 1986, 1990). 
It is not customary, at least not until recently (see Wight 2002),
to ask why a moral philosopher such as Adam Smith was so con-
cerned with increasing “the wealth of nations.” After all, he did not
place a high value on aﬄuence, and in fact regarded the pursuit of
riches as meretricious and its inﬂuence corrupting (Rotwein 1973,
Wight 1999). So how is it that he was able to concern himself with
its annual increase? 
In part it was in deference to a matter of distribution: “No soci-
ety,” Smith stated, “can surely be ﬂourishing or happy, of which the
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far greater part of the members are poor and miserable.” While
Smith is espousing the material well-being of the common people,
luxury occupied most of the attention during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Most men of luxury gained their fortunes by
trading, transporting, or by lending. In The Quintessence of Capitalism:
A Study on the History and Psychology of the Modern Businessman (1915:
34-35), Warner Sombart notes that a ﬁfteenth century architect, musi-
cian, and courtier, Battista Alberti, listed wholesale trade, the seek-
ing of treasure trove, the ingratiating oneself with a rich man to
become his heir, usury, and the rental of pastures, horses, and the
like as the best ways of getting rich. Sombart further cites an unnamed
seventeenth century commentator as adding royal service, soldiering,
and alchemy to the list. 
If the medieval world was, as many have pointed out, a zero-sum
game (and as implied in Locke’s passage, above), how could Adam
Smith advocate increasing the material well-being of the common
folk without taking it from the rich? The answer lies in the lists pro-
vided by Sombart. Noticeably absent is “manufacturing.” What Adam
Smith was searching for, and what he bequeathed us, was an insti-
tutional order that would eliminate zero-sum games. 
Although concentrating human eﬀort on manufacturing, on pro-
ducing more and more, might be a grand delusion if thought to
enhance individual happiness (according to Smith), it would at least
contribute to the social welfare. It would do this by contributing to
the material well-being of the common people, relieving social ten-
sions (at least those attributed to the inadequate provision for human
wants) and contributing to a civil society. 
This, of course, is the stance taken by Francis Bacon. The inspi-
ration for true learning was, for Bacon, “not the pleasure of study
and the excitement of discovery, but the needs of mankind” (Prior
1964: 47)—although not entirely with the welfare of the common
man (Merchant 1983: 177, Mumford 1970).
Bacon’s notion of a species ambition urged an enlargement of the
power and dominion of the human race over the universe of things.5
As a species ambition it was pure because it was not achieved at
the expense of other persons or states. (The assumption was, of
course, that nature has no interests, an assumption that is, itself,
worthy of additional “thick description.”) But by what rules, by what
institution, should this be made eﬀective? Social living requires some
acceptance of and compliance with ﬁxed, if generalized, rules of con-
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duct. And these rules of conduct must be formulated in such a way
that everybody understands them, accepts them, and acts accord-
ingly. In order to grasp the real meaning and signiﬁcance of eco-
nomic laws, we must think of them as a speciﬁc set of rules appropriate
for a speciﬁc mode of production and distribution found in a par-
ticular society. 
The Law of Supply and Demand, rather than the symbolic expres-
sion of natural laws or natural processes, or even as the represen-
tation of statistical regularity,6 is our most fundamental expression of
a generalized guide for living. The Law of Supply and Demand is
a social code. It should be formulated in terms somewhat like the
following: “If commercial exchange is to be an eﬀective instrument
for want satisfaction, sellers should raise prices when buyers increase
their demand,” and so on, for its various propositions (Lowe 1942:
439-440). In this way the Law of Supply and Demand provides the
beacon from which human action (in a market economy) takes its
bearing. Only if people, in fact, act in accordance with the Law of
Supply and Demand will the price system function to bring about
the social world imagined by economists. The Law of Supply and
Demand is a primary “rule of the game,” perhaps the rule, of the
Dominant Modern Ethos.7
5. Ecology, an Emerging Worldview and Aldo Leopold
At this point the door has been opened for a discussion of ecology
as a science. Since so many environmentalists appeal to ecology, stu-
dents should be familiar with at least some of the models that have
guided ecological research. A brief discussion of ecology, especially
the history of ecology,8 leads to a direct consideration of Aldo Leopold
and his essay, “The Land Ethic.” The essay employs many of the
concepts discussed in any historical overview of ecology (the com-
munity model and the energy ﬂow model, for example); but because
Leopold was an ecologist, and appealed to ecology to explain and
justify his conclusions, it will have appeal to MBA students who
already elevate science and the scientist in the intellectual hierarchy. 
As has been pointed out by Callicott (1987), and certainly by oth-
ers, Leopold’s ethics derive from the Scottish Enlightenment that
extended from David Hume to and through Charles Darwin. This
tradition placed moral sentiments at the center of ethics; and,
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signiﬁcantly, Adam Smith, author of the Theory of Moral Sentiments,
contributed to this tradition. Showing how Adam Smith, the “father”
of economics and author of The Wealth of Nations is also the author
of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and in direct line of descent to Aldo
Leopold can serve important rhetorical purposes in an environmen-
tal ethics class. It may also provide another way to “close the cir-
cle” between economics and ecology.9
Finally, Leopold’s approach to ethics ties in with the general ori-
entation of this paper: that we do not need ethical theories, rules,
and principles to decide what is right, but detailed description of the
relevant circumstances, including how it is we traditionally view
things, in order to act ethically. As Des Jardins points out (2001:
198), “Leopold’s ethics is focused less on rules that guide action and
more on moral dispositions or virtues.” 
Any discussion of the science of ecology should make clear that
all philosophers do not agree on the lessons to be drawn from ecol-
ogy. Nor do they agree from which ecological model these lessons
should be drawn. However, ecology might suggest new ways for
approaching not only the management of environmental issues but
the epistemological, metaphysical, and ontological questions that some
argue underlie them (Devall and Sessions 1985). That is, we must
recognize that many problems are traced to these kinds of deep
philosophical questions and ecology may provide diﬀerent models for
thinking about them, models for treating the causes of environmen-
tal problems and not just the symptoms (Morowitz 1972, Everndon
1978, Callicott 1986, and Orr 2003). 
Conclusion
To conclude, we oﬀer a personal example that demonstrates a main
theme of this paper, while introducing a further thought on the
nature of environmental ethics education in general. 
One of us regularly teaches an MBA course called Business and the
Environment. It is billed as an environmental management class and
students consider topics like ISO 14001, the Natural Step, full-cost
pricing, and life-cycle analysis. Students always seem to consider the
class an ethics class. This past summer, an undergraduate class was
taught to a group of American students. All but one was a business
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major. The class, labeled Global Marketing: Environmental Dimensions,
was taught in Rome, Italy. 
The ﬁrst week introduced students to environmental issues by read-
ing J. Donald Hughes’ Pan’s Travail: the Environmental Problems of the
Ancient Greeks and Romans (1994). Given the setting, this was chosen
because it was an historian’s account of the life and times of the
ancient Romans—with an environmental focus. The second week
they read and discussed an introduction to Karl-Henrik Robèrt’s sci-
ence based systems framework, The Natural Step (Nattrass and Altomare
1999). This is a managerial approach intended to help businesses
understand and move toward sustainability. 
On the last day of class the students were debriefed. Among the
several questions asked of them was the following: “How many of
you think this course was an ethics course?” All students in the class
raised their hand. A course that has no ethics content in the tradi-
tional sense was, nevertheless, perceived by the students taking it to
be an ethics class.10 What we ﬁnd particularly interesting here is that
the books did not raise ethical issues in anything that would resem-
ble what we believe would be the traditional way of raising them.
The students saw the ethical issues on their own. This personal exam-
ple makes clear that when the environment is considered in a course,
it is unmistakable that an unconscious environmental ethic is being
challenged—in this case the unconscious environmental ethic that
has been part of all the students’ other business courses. 
This example also illustrates how teaching environmental ethics
can be incorporated into almost any course in such a way that it
challenges students to temporarily bracket the current modern world-
view and ethos. Because the course dealt implicitly with environ-
mental ethics, students were able to see connections and to think
critically in ways that may never have been suggested before. This
situation, ﬁrst, allows students to “play” with the material and arrive
at conclusions themselves. Second, it opens the door for students to
pursue ethical concerns in ways relevant to themselves. These are
what we consider to be the goals of education: students are guided
and oﬀered the freedom to think as well as inspired to take those
thoughts in new directions. 
Environmental ethics should be taught consciously because an envi-
ronmental ethic is already being taught implicitly. But a conscious
eﬀort at teaching environmental ethics, if it is to be anything more
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than an exercise in repeating back that which has been learned,
must be done in a way that encourages “a self-conscious stepping
back” but without providing new rules for analysis and decision mak-
ing. Students should be given the opportunity to wonder—and wan-
der. The teaching of environmental ethics, therefore, is a prime
vehicle of learner-centered teaching and values education. 
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N
1. Our dictionary deﬁnes ethos as “the disposition, character, or fundamental
values peculiar to a speciﬁc person, people, culture, or movement.”
2. Speciﬁcally, we draw on “The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the
Concept of Man,” “The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind,” “Religion
As a Cultural System,” and on “Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred
Symbols,” all in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973). Our general approach to the
problem, is, we feel, akin to that of Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good, 1970),
Stanley Hauerwas (Vision and Virtue, 1981) and Peter Levine (Living Without Philosophy,
1998), although none index environment or ecology in their books. 
3. We do not know if, in fact, this is the origins of the expression “it was a
steal,” but when this exercise is complete, students can be asked to reﬂect on and
consider from where this expression might have come. 
4. E.B. Tylor ﬁrst formulated the concept of culture in anthropology. On the
ﬁrst page of his book, Primitive Culture (1871), he deﬁned culture as “that complex
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Culture was every-
thing that man thinks and does that is transmitted extra-genetically. 
5. There is an interesting parallel between Bacon’s position and that of William
James in the latter’s essay, “The Moral Equivalent of War” ( James 1970, originally
1910).
6. Economist Donald McCloskey has noted that empirical support, even for the
most basic and fundamental of economic principles, the Law of Demand, is not
too persuasive (1985: 57-62). 
7. “We should not be surprised or disappointed,” Alasdair MacIntyre wrote,
“that the generalizations and maxims of the best social science share certain char-
acteristics of their predecessors—the proverbs of folk societies, the generalizations
of jurists, the maxims of Machiavelli (1984: 105).” 
8. See, for example, Worster 1985 and Golley 1993.
9. We state at the outset and repeat throughout that we are not concerned with
any particular environmental ethics curriculum. We do not hesitate to point out
where the approach we adopt leads and how that integrates into what the students
already bring (or should bring) with them to class. 
10. After asking how many thought it was an ethics class, they were then asked
what it was about the class that made it an ethics class. A variety of responses were
received. Four student responses follow: 
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“I thought the course in Rome could be considered an ethics course because
each issue we addressed related to the morality of the situation . . . I think your
class made us realize that environmental issues are moral issues.” 
“The course was an ethics course because it made us think twice and gave
us a choice. [W]e became aware of issues and choices that we may not have
seen in the past, but we should realize because they will aﬀect us in the future.”
In the context of a very anthropocentric response, a third student said, and
later wrote out for me, this response: “Due to this class, I have come to under-
stand [murder] in a stronger light. Everyday, we as people of this earth, are
doing little things that are destroying our home . . . It was an ethical class
because it led us to a crossroads where we have to make a decision to either
continue killing or improve this world.” 
“I thought that our class was an ethics class because it took into consider-
ation the actions of humans on our environment and whether or not those
actions were appropriate, morally. We looked at both the “inappropriate”
actions as well as what is being done currently to correct our negative impact
on our home.”
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